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Growing American Rubber: Strategic Plants and the Politics of National Se-
curity, by Mark R. Finlay. Studies in Modern Science, Technology, and 
the Environment. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2009. 
xiii, 317 pp. Illustrations, tables, notes, index. $49.95 cloth. 
Reviewer Joanne Abel Goldman is associate professor of history at the Univer-
sity of Northern Iowa. She is the author of “Mobilizing Science in the Heart-
land: Iowa State College, the State University of Iowa, and National Science 
during WWII” in the Annals of Iowa (2000). 
In Growing American Rubber, Mark Finlay examines the century-long 
effort to supplement the imported rubber supply with either a domes-
tically produced source, natural or synthetic, or a foreign supply that 
could meet the needs of the growing U.S. economy. Finlay argues that 
the intensity of that effort grew and faded in direct correlation to the 
urgency of national security concerns. During World War II, the situa-
tion grew dire, and Iowans became particularly vocal as they lobbied 
for the development of grain-based synthetic rubber.  
 Finlay documents the history of early rubber production. In the 
1920s, the United States imported the bulk of its rubber supply from 
British and Dutch plantations in the South Pacific. To stabilize profits, 
England regulated exports, and subsequently prices rose. Nonetheless, 
demand continued to increase, and the importance of a domestic supply 
became urgent. Thomas Edison rallied to the cause. Edison’s group 
made valiant efforts to identify and grow domestic rubber plants, 
but despite inexhaustible energy, abundant resources, and unwaver-
ing commitment to success, he died before developing a reliable and 
adequate crop able to meet the growing demand.  
 World War II exacerbated an already critical situation inasmuch as 
the military engagements required rubber for tanks, airplanes, and 
medical supplies. With transoceanic trade compromised and the plan-
tations of the South Pacific vulnerable to Japanese earth-scorching, the 
demand for domestic production reached a crescendo. In 1942 the fed-
eral government launched the Emergency Rubber Program, a national 
research initiative to solve the shortfall. Finlay likens the program to 
the Manhattan Project “in terms of scale, urgency and interdisciplinary 
scope” (141).  
 Government and private-sector scientists experimented with 
rubber-producing plants in California (including one in a Japanese 
internment camp), Arizona, Texas, and Minnesota. The United States 
controlled plantations in Mexico and Haiti as well. In addition, people 
began in earnest to synthetically develop rubber from grain-based 
alcohol and petroleum. The synthetic initiatives became politically 
charged as midwestern farmers faced off with petroleum producers. 
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Iowa Senator Guy Gillette chaired a Senate committee to study the 
problem and quickly became a proponent of grain-based alcohol pro-
duction. The committee concluded that the government must support 
a new agency devoted to synthetic rubber production made exclu-
sively from plants. Despite its efforts, the president vetoed the bill. The 
Gillette Committee then threw the debate into the public limelight, 
harnessing spirited public support throughout the Midwest. Roosevelt 
responded by supporting research and production on both grain- and 
petroleum-based synthetic rubber. By the end of 1942, the debates 
calmed and production of synthetic rubber reduced the urgent rubber 
shortage.  
 The whole rubber supply drama reaches a climax in chapter 6; 
there Finlay’s organization proves to be weak. By that point it is un-
clear why the mammoth effort to grow or synthetically produce rub-
ber never satisfied the demand. Not until chapter 7 does Finlay tell us 
that ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and scandal together with weather 
and disease events plagued much of the effort. In chapter 8 Finlay con-
cludes the story by noting that with the end of World War II, the quest 
for rubber self-sufficiency waned, following the pattern that had per-
sisted during most of the first half of the century. 
 Growing American Rubber is a good history of the rubber industry, 
private and public efforts to control the industry, and its vulnerability 
to world politics. This is important because we all need to understand 
that increased globalization and increased outsourcing intensify our 
vulnerability. Therefore, this book should be of interest to historians of 
science and technology, economics, and the twentieth century as well 
as to makers of public policy. 
 
 
Staley: The Fight for a New American Labor Movement, by Steven K. 
Ashby and C. J. Hawking. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2009. xi, 358 pp. Illustrations, notes, glossary, index. $75.00 cloth, 
$25.00 paper. 
Reviewer Colin Gordon is professor of history at the University of Iowa. He is 
the author of Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City (2008); 
Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (2003); 
and New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920–1935 (1994). 
Each era of American economic history has its emblematic labor 
struggle: Homestead in the 1890s, steel at the close of World War I, the 
Flint Sit-Down in 1936–37, General Motors in 1946, the Memphis Sani-
tation Strike in 1968. Each of these, in its recounting, is held out as both 
a snapshot of that era’s labor relations and the blueprint for a new la-
